

# Native Noses and Nationalist Zoos

## Debates in Colonial and Early Nationalist Anthropology of Castes and Tribes

*The beginning of the study of anthropology in the 19th century coincided with the need of the colonial authorities to 'understand' and assert themselves over their native subjects. New fields such as statistics came to be used to categorise and define subjects who were then placed in relation to each other in a fixed hierarchy. As this article argues, the tenor of the dominant anthropological discourse on the tribal showed only a marginal shift with the emergence of nationalism. In the early post-independent years, however, the question, that still continues to this day, of 'what to do with the tribal' was debated strongly between those (Ghurye and others) who advocated their 'assimilation' and the other side (chiefly Verrier Elwin) who argued for special protected spaces for the tribals.*

**R SRIVATSAN**

It is well known that the anthropological discourse on castes and tribes in India has a long history and that its beginnings reinforce colonial rule from the late 19th century onwards. Understanding this early discourse will help us grasp the new way in which the nationalist discourse on the tribal builds on the earlier understanding with crucial shifts in emphasis. This paper will be divided into two parts. Between these, we will review two debates in the late 19th and mid-20th centuries, in order to map the change in focus that occurs in anthropology and the discourse on the tribal with the rise of nationalism. Part I discusses Herbert Hope Risley's theory of the racial basis of Indian caste and tribal culture, formulated in the 1890s. Part II describes two opposing programmes in late colonial India. The first is a contestation and refinement of Risley's theory in the late colonial census administration in the work of B S Guha (1931), and P C Mahalanobis (1949). The second is a 1940s debate on the need to protect tribals, in which G S Ghurye attacks Verrier Elwin's proposals for an area earmarked as a "zoo" in which the Baiga could pursue changes in their ways of living at their own pace. While the first programme is located squarely within the epistemological domain of Risley's science of colonial rule, the second is located on the margins of the epistemological domain of nationalism and its commitment to tribal communities.

### **Castes and Tribes**

The colonial impulse to systematise knowledge of society according to castes and tribes in the late 19th century comes into focus between crossing interests, logics and frames of thought. These follow different cycles of continuity; two were quests that began before the revolt of 1857, and one a direct consequence of it.

First, Evangelism was one such frame of thought which had always needed and generated a discourse about native society to justify the Christian alternative.<sup>1</sup> Reverend M A Sherring's anthropological work, which we will examine shortly, is an

example of such an initiative which remained active post-1857. Second, the Utilitarian conviction of many officials was that while a unified system of laws was a necessity in the sphere of 'civil society', cultural specificity might be the only viable option in the regime of personal law. Our discussion of Risley will demonstrate evidence of the Utilitarian strain in the late 19th century anthropology of castes and tribes. Third, at the practical level, the colonial administration, shaken by the magnitude and ferocity of the revolt of 1857, was hard-pressed to understand how the Indian character found fault with, took offence and rebelled against the seemingly innocuous use of beef and pork fat in the Enfield rifle cartridge. As Nicholas Dirks puts it, "concerns about revenue gave way to a preoccupation with social order"<sup>2</sup> and the British needed to understand Indian society as opposed to economy alone.

Early attempts at an ethnographic description followed different schemes of organisation which shared a common preoccupation in the search for an origin of caste. The gaze towards the past as explicit in written records available automatically centred on brahmanism.<sup>3</sup> What went out of view when the gaze was focused on the written record was the fact that each community had its method of eulogising its own culture at the cost of others, and this had varying historical effects according to the political force of the community. Also lost was the possibility that several culturally vibrant communities did not necessarily privilege writing and thus implicitly, if partially, devalued the primacy of brahmanism. Therefore, privileging brahmanism because it had a recorded culture irretrievably biased the dynamic cultural balance in its favour.<sup>4</sup> Such a positioning of brahmanism, as the decadent, traditional centre of a colonised culture was a necessary ground against which the progressive, modernising, metropolitan culture of the coloniser could rise in relief. At the same time, this positioning set the stage for a political reformation of Hinduism in terms which retained brahmanical and caste-Hindu centrality while inverting the vector of evil in order to make it point towards colonial rule.

Sherring, Ibbetson and Nesfield are three investigators of castes and tribes who wrote anthropological texts against which Risley's work plays out its rule of racial difference.

## I The Nose and Colonial Anthropometry

### Sherring, Ibbetson and Nesfield

Sherring's description of the representative castes and tribes in Benares follows a twin impulse.<sup>5</sup> He first describes the origin of each caste category as a degraded product of the miscegenation of the purebred castes, based on existing translations and annotations of the texts of Manu, without reference to actually existing groups. Next, he uses an empirical reading to determine how the caste groups appear and inhabit contemporary society. His reading thus, (unconsciously) straddles the gap between on the one hand, a categorisation according to what may be called an ancient jurisprudence of questionable authoritativeness, and on the other, a sociological narrative of existing groups in Benares that is due to the empiricist current of 19th century British thinking.<sup>6</sup> There is no suspicion in Sherring's mind that what was translated as a categorisation on the one hand, and the contemporary sociological grouping that category was made to cover on the other, may not have belonged to a common epistemological or administrative framework.<sup>7</sup> In its implicit intention to establish the caste laws as elaborated in the dharmashastras as an ancient signpost for forms of knowledge adequate to colonial rule, Sherring's definition and activation of caste tradition breached new epistemological frontiers.

In his introduction to *Panjab Castes*, an iconoclastic essay on the erroneous ways in which the contemporary debate conceptualised caste, Denzil Ibbetson argues that the thread of common descent, or blood characterised early tribal communities all round the world.<sup>8</sup> As life became more complex and occupational differentiation occurred, most communities preferred to inherit the legacy of occupation rather than that of blood. Peculiar conditions prevailed in India, whereby brahmans consolidated their power and privilege by insisting on levitical descent rather than priestly occupation. Other less powerful caste groups followed, resulting in the caste system and the arrest of Indian civilisational progress. Thus, the tribe's ancient postulate of purity of lineage and the strengthening of the community is in some ways reproduced in the caste system in its later history, which then begins to prohibit intermarriage and miscegenation between castes. Ibbetson views the stress placed by his contemporaries on the ancient varna system as excessive, and he moves towards an empirically derived description based on petrified occupational groupings, describing their actions as political rather than in terms of any deeply rooted racial tendencies. He bemoans the difficulty of establishing the hierarchical order between castes and uses several examples to show the wealth of exception defeating the rules of caste hierarchy in India. The relative sophistication of his understanding of the fluidity of caste 'hierarchy', his sensitivity to the internal political dynamics of a society supposedly stratified by caste, and his insight into the everyday use of specific caste terms in discursive statements without a factual referent are exemplary in colonial discourse, prefiguring developments in perspective which occur near three quarters of a century later with M N Srinivas and Bernard Cohn.

John Nesfield's theory of the caste system provides us with the third signpost with which to triangulate Risley's epistemological terrain.<sup>9</sup> He argued that the main bond which fused a caste group into a new social unit was the community of function, or occupation, rather than the community of kinship (blood, race) or creed. "Function and function only, as I think, was the foundation upon which the whole caste system in India was built up."<sup>10</sup> In asserting this, Nesfield broke with the current conceptualisation of caste as a product of the clash of the Aryan and Dravidian races, insisting that the differences in race had vanished before caste arrived. He also argued that race, language and culture were different spheres of investigation which cannot be collapsed. The proposition that the sympathy of occupation drove caste groups into coherent and interlocking units led Nesfield to propose that amalgamation of racial types led to the existence of a single Indian race forming the basis of a possible national unity. Such an assertion flew in the face of the ascending racial orthodoxy and his thesis withered under Risley's anthropometric onslaught. Nesfield too argued that the brahmans instituted the first closure of caste, quickly leading to a similar sealing of other caste groups. He proposed that precipitation of society into caste groups was ultimately counter to progress, which would occur when the embrace of scientific reason caused caste boundaries to melt, first with the brahman, 'the *fons et origo mali*', after which the rest would soon follow.<sup>11</sup> Like Ibbetson's work, Nesfield's too projects interesting phantom projects of a possible colonial anthropology and its effects on the administration it served.<sup>12</sup> Both their perspectives serve as implicit rallying points against Risley's dominant model in late colonial and early nationalist anthropology.<sup>13</sup>

### Risley, Race and Anthropology

H H Risley has been described as a 'Mephistophelian', brilliant thinker, influenced by John Stuart Mill and by the conservatism of the German historical school.<sup>14</sup> He exemplified the fusion between administrator and anthropologist in what Dirks has called the 'ethnographic state'.<sup>15</sup>

Risley's 'Introductory Essay: Caste in Relation to Marriage' in the *Tribes and Castes of Bengal* argues the centrality of race in the constitution of caste society.<sup>16</sup> He starts by assuming Alfred Lyall's thesis that a gradual brahmanising of the aboriginal, non-Aryan or casteless tribes continued to occur in his times, based on his own observations of specific cases.<sup>17</sup> This historical process happened, according to Risley's citation of Lyall, through four distinct routes: (i) individual brahmanisation of the well-to-do members of tribes through the manufacture of an obscure genealogy; (ii) group brahmanisation of a large number of aborigines through the absorption into some religious sect; (iii) brahmanisation of a whole tribe of aborigines enrolling themselves in the ranks of Hinduism through the fabrication of a new caste and the erasure of the old tribal designation and practices from memory; and (iv) brahmanisation of a whole tribe, without elimination of tribal characteristics. In the Lyall/Risley theory of brahmanisation, the tribes face a barrier to their social progress in the form of resistance to intermarriage from the existing "purebred" castes, at the apex of which are the brahmans. It is for this reason that what we might call a 'neo-kshatriya' caste usually descended from a mythically banished or fleeing rajput king is most often chosen as a point of entry into the Hindu caste structure. The aspirant groups or individuals then have to

seek out other newly successful, peripheral groups in the Hindu fold for spouses for their children. Thus, in Risley, the conceptual topography of an aboriginal tribe is articulated as an explicitly theorised marginal category surrounding, and aspiring to the status of, a Hindu/brahmanical Aryan centre.

The difference between a purebred caste and an aboriginal tribe lay in the differing basis of their exogamous group. In the brahman caste, the 'gotra', marking the internal boundary within which marriage may not occur, was a patriarchal kin group named after an ancestor, while in the tribe, the same boundary was marked by a group named after a totemistic object/animal. Brahmanisation involved the replacement of the totemistic group name by an 'eponymous' one. In addition to these two types of exogamous groupings, (a) eponymous and (b) totemistic. Risley found three other, (c) territorial, (d) local, communal or family sections; and (e) titular or nickname groups. However, the neglect of the last three in his ethnology of the caste system implicitly privileges brahmanisation and removes other processes from the scope of inquiry.

Unlike Nesfield, Risley linked the three regions of race, language and culture. The aboriginal desire to approximate the brahmanical ideal and marry upwards, worked against the racist desire of the upper castes to reject pollution through marriage. In this encounter the tribal language of the group may or may not be discarded in favour of the sanskritised one.

Risley's strategy was to disprove Nesfield's functionalist theory of caste using anthropometry. He concluded based on the anthropological advice of the Englishman, Flower and the work of the Frenchman Topinard that the purebred resistance to forming kinship relations through marriage, would generate a measurable difference between the Aryan centre and the aboriginal periphery in anthropometric characters such as the shape of the nose, mouth and cheeks. Thus,

If we take a series of castes in Bengal, Bihar or the North-Western Provinces, and arrange them in the order of the average nasal index [ratio of width of nose to its height], so that the caste with the finest nose shall be at the top, and that with the coarsest at the bottom of the list, it will be found that this order substantially corresponds with the accepted order of social precedence.<sup>18</sup>

This assertion was to serve anthropometry as a call to arms in the service of an epoch of evolutionism then at its zenith in the west.

### Colonialism, Race and Modernity

Risley stated two reasons for undertaking afresh the project of describing the tribes and castes of Bengal. One was the need to provide administration with the knowledge of native society, which ... is made up of a network of subdivisions governed by rules which affect every department of life, and...in Bengal at any rate, next to nothing is known about the system upon which the whole native population regulates its domestic and social relations. If legislation, or even executive action, is ever to touch these relations in a satisfactory manner, an ethnographic survey of Bengal, and a record of the customs of the people, is as necessary an incident of good administration as a cadastral survey of the land and a record of rights of its tenants.<sup>19</sup>

Risley's respect for heathen custom locates him in the conservative, Burkean lineage of British thinking. However, the metaphor of the cadastral survey and record of tenant rights harks back to the colonial rationalisation of land revenue in the 19th century, locating the roots of his project in the utilitarian 'pannionium' of law that both powered colonial rule and (as will be argued in this and the following sections) halted its

imagination at the threshold of a norm-based, interventionist concept of welfare.<sup>20</sup>

Another of Risley's reasons for the castes and tribes project was to provide the modern science of anthropology with data from a society in which races had not mixed indecipherably. Given the survival of barbarous and semi-barbarous customs, both Aryan and non-Aryan, he hoped that such a survey would lay bare the early history of marriage, family, relationship, inheritance and growth of property in land.<sup>21</sup>

Risley's hypothesis about race in caste was plausibly sympathetic.

How comes it that the Aryan race, which in Southern Europe... has modified its physical type by free intermixture with Turanian elements, displayed in India a marked antipathy to marriage with persons of an alien race and devised an elaborate system of taboos for the prevention of such unions? An explanation may perhaps be found in the fact that in India alone were the Aryans brought into close contact with an unequivocally black race. The sense of differences of colour, which, for all our talk of common humanity, still plays a great, and politically, often an inconvenient, part in the history of the world, finds forcible expression in the Vedic descriptions of the people whom the Aryans found in possession of the plains of India.<sup>22</sup>

The crux of colonialism arises in Risley's tolerant description of the difference between the European Aryan race and the Indian, ie, in the latter's historical inability to intermix with other races. This closure of the upper caste group in the face of new entrants becomes for Risley a symptom of a malign destiny: it marks the impossibility of a national community capable of forming a modern state representing the interests of each member of society. Risley in his later work *The People of India* (1915) argued that Indian society, being incapable of modern nation statehood, needed British rule indefinitely to inculcate a sense of nationhood in the polity. This understanding of the self-centredness of the brahmanical Hindu community structure forms the basis of Risley's successful steering of the concept of communal representation of political interests that would fructify in Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909.<sup>23</sup>

The success of Risley's project in its scope if not its technical detail (as we will see later) poses a question: In what way did the authoritarian, modernising turn of utilitarian thinking interweave the paternalistic, benevolent tradition of conservative thought in the colonial matrix? Thomas Metcalf has pointed out what is almost a mirror image of Risley's position in the authoritarian liberalism and Utilitarian philosophy of law of James Fitzjames Stephen, legal member of the Viceroy's Council (1869-72).<sup>24</sup> Stephen had argued that the establishment of law and order and the enforcement of contracts, "somewhat grim presents for one people to make to another", constituted a moral conquest that superseded the prior physical conquest. The law, sum and substance of English education of the Indian, was the compulsory gospel.<sup>25</sup> The difference between Stephen and Risley can be attributed to their respective emphases on the historical duty of colonial rule. Stephen's authoritarian liberalism was in favour of coercive modernisation of the native through the rule of law, while Risley's paternalism favoured colonial rule based on custom, slowly educating the heathen into the ways of civilisation.

Stephen argued against the Ilbert bill (1883) introduced to equate the white man and the native in law, asserting the justification for Imperial absolutism in the evident superiority of the conquering race.<sup>26</sup> While we have no matching perspective on the Ilbert Bill from Risley's published work, the implicit location of his centre-periphery model of brahmanism in the evolution

of modern man suggests that his reasoning would not easily incline towards the equality of the native and the ruling race before colonial law. Stephen and Risley uncover for us, from two sides of the equation between the western belief in its civilisational superiority and the rule of colonial law in the late 19th century, some pathways of thought through which the practice of colonialism was rationalised in theories ranging across Utilitarianism, conservative thought and authoritarian liberalism, and was vindicated in an evolutionist, Eurocentric anthropology.<sup>27</sup> Thus it would be a mistake to read Risley's intellectual position (or James' for that matter) and administrative action as a simple personal choice, either malevolent or ill informed. Nor would it be adequate to click a philosophical tongue ruing the unfortunate if incorrigible racism that somehow vitiated the great civilisational norms and promises of an otherwise benevolent British rule.<sup>28</sup> The issue deserves more than a cursory glance, and for this we will have to make a brief excursion into Foucault's notion of governmental rationality.

Foucault has argued in his lecture on governmental rationality that the philosophical problem of the state has undergone a gradual and complex change in Europe from the 16th century onwards.<sup>29</sup> The earlier Machiavellian model located the prince in a relationship of externality and singular transcendence with respect to the territory over which he ruled, but was not a part of.<sup>30</sup> Therefore the Machiavellian problematic was to deal with the strategy by which the prince retains coercive control over his principality. State theory was about sovereign power of the prince, and about marshalling the force to rule the territory seen as a space to be submitted to sovereign law. The change mapped by Foucault traces a shift from this way of representing state theory, to one where the question asked with increasing sophistication is, "how does one govern the population?". The answer to the question of who should rule is no longer the self evident supra-legal singularity named 'the prince', but gradually becomes a multiplicity of agents governing the population, from within state and society, e.g., "monarch, emperor, king, prince, lord, magistrate, prelate, judge and the like".<sup>31</sup> Governing is seen as the right disposition of 'things', such as natural resources, wealth and human health – the focus is a new way of imagining the economy in relation to the population (rather than in relation to the *oikos* or household). Foucault maps the emergence of the disciplines of economics and statistics, welfare and governmental police/policy as the institutional and philosophical instruments that detail the shift from sovereignty to government.<sup>32</sup> In another essay, Foucault calls by the name 'biopolitics', the utterly new instruments of state which begin to conceptualise the population and set it up as a target of public health, longevity, and birth rates as aspects of welfare policy.<sup>33</sup> It is important to note that this shift in the state model parallels an intensification of the question of sovereignty, which becomes critical but loses its regal centrality.<sup>34</sup> Equally, while sovereignty was central in the Machiavellian model, the problem of keeping the subjects contented was important in a secondary way. Keeping these provisos in mind, from subordination to sovereign law, to government of a population, then, is the change in the way the state is imagined, preceding, paralleling and continuing through the 19th century philosophical developments of liberalism, utilitarianism and enlightenment rationality that characterise the normative impulse of modernity in Europe. What happened in the colony?

The answer can only be suggestive here. It is well documented that the British in the late 19th century did see themselves as

alien and superior rulers; from the viceregency at Delhi to the magistracy in the district, the structure of rule represented the absolute sovereignty of the Crown.<sup>35</sup> Metcalf has argued that the already insular existence of the British in India was further driven into a position of externality (a) in the aftermath of 1857, (b) because of the winds of evolutionist racism which characterised European thought in the late 19th century and (c) in the perspective of an authoritarian liberalism expressing itself typically in Stephen's view of racial difference. This to a large extent was the cause of the problems they faced in administration.<sup>36</sup> Partha Chatterjee's essay on 'The Colonial State' makes a powerful assertion of the difference between the modern state in the universal sense of the term and the colonial state; the latter in its true form,

...was a modern regime of power *destined never to fulfil its normalising mission* because the premise of its power was the preservation of the alienness of the ruling group.<sup>37</sup>

Our own comparison between Risley and Stephen gives us another clue about the question of modern government and welfare in relation to late 19th century colonial India.<sup>38</sup> The passages from Stephen cited above point to the supremacy of the rule of law, as does the tenor of Risley's administrative reasoning behind the *Tribes and Castes of Bengal* (p xxxiv).<sup>39</sup>

We would like to suggest here that the conditions encountered by colonial rule in India in the late 19th century were not conducive of a governmental rationality marked by a fully articulated biopolitical concept of welfare, with the symptomatic effect that the thematic of the rule of law was crucial to the rhetoric of colonial administration.<sup>40</sup> This was not always the case, as the discussion on education to follow will show. This does not also mean that the question of economics did not exist in British colonial rule – the importance of economic exploitation, and the Indian laboratory for Utilitarian economic experiments are well known. However, the configuration of government and sovereignty (in the Machiavellian sense) was not crystallised for all time as decisively in favour of government as it was in the European model described by Foucault.

A priority of sovereignty over governmentalised welfare also demonstrates its logic, albeit for different reasons and with a different historical cycle, in the colonial rule of the agency areas – the rebellions and unrests in specific tribal groups and the need to quell them in a way that asserted the sovereignty of the British led to a less than surefooted advance of attempts at welfare until late in the 1930s.<sup>41</sup>

'Colonial governmentality' in the late 19th century was a much weakened and contested form of the governmentality Foucault seems to have had in mind when he coined the term to describe the formation of the modern European state.<sup>42</sup> The implication is not that 'we' have suffered the lack of the welfare aspect of governmentality under British rule (welfare as we shall see is more ambiguous than that). It is rather that the late 19th century conjuncture of colonialism exerted a historically specific tension in British political thinking about India, forcing it to retreat somewhat into the configuration of an external and singular sovereignty that had some of its antecedents in Machiavelli's advice to the prince. However, the hierarchically administered rule of modern colonial law set it apart from the incipiently arbitrary structure of medieval sovereignty giving it the specific form of a thoroughly institutionalised despotism, decentralised or otherwise.<sup>43</sup> This law was an ambiguous legacy of the Utilitarian belief in the necessity of a benevolent despotism in India.

The British policy with respect to native well-being, through the 19th century, worked through laws restricting some modes of conduct and promoting others. Stokes has argued that the British exercises in land settlement through Ryotwari constitute a prime example of this (in our language interventionist) use of the law to promote forms of conduct which would characterise a market-driven agricultural subject.<sup>44</sup> The law for the Utilitarians and their precursors was an instrument to set free the human right to property and thus to release the ryot as an agent of progress from the bondage of oriental despotism. We will touch on the differentia specifica of this right after briefly describing the educational project of colonialism.

The other major interventionist measure undertaken in colonial rule was in the field of education, where the British had lasting effects on the social structure. Stokes has analysed the historical roots of education in the early 19th century Evangelical drive in which the missionary and the free-trader found common cause against the mercantilist operations of the East India Company, supporting ultimately the establishment of British rule after 1857.<sup>45</sup> The early drive to educate the native was modelled on the British 'radical school' concept that human nature was the same in all races, and that acquired characteristics were readily alterable.<sup>46</sup> The aim was silently and steadily to undermine the 'fabric of error' which constituted the sin of heathen life. The release of the native from the thrall of Hindu despotism would result in the formation of a soul which held together a belief in its own virtue and an individualistic desire for British goods. This would trigger nothing less than a fundamental revolution in the relations between the rulers and the ruled, civilising the latter with English culture diffused through education, and assimilating the native into the economy through the expanding market for British goods. The historical process of beginning to educate the native, clearly, was modelled not along the lines of a negative or repressive law, but along the lines of a positive intervention, in the manner of governmentality.

However, there is a difference if we take as accurate Stokes' account that radical philosophy of the early 19th century put its faith in the potential unity of human nature.<sup>47</sup> One of the markers of the full articulation of governmentality, if we read Ian Hacking's argument in *The Taming of Chance* in conjunction with Foucault's concept of Biopolitics, is that the concept of human nature (and the concept of a human right that accompanied that historical concept of human nature) is replaced gradually and decisively by the concept of the human norm starting from the 1830s onwards.<sup>48</sup> It is this conceptual maturation of the norm which facilitates the instrumental manipulation of the population, one of the key features of governmentality. The intervention to educate, based on the concept of human nature, or the promulgation of a land settlement law to free a human right, would be structurally different from a biopolitical intervention based on the statistical norm of humanness which begins to take root in Europe from the 1830s onwards. We will argue in the next section that the notion of the norm expressed in colonial anthropology is weakened as late as Risley because of the dominance of evolutionism which saw the concept of race-in-caste as determining the limits of Indian modernity.

Within this 'regressive' structure of the linkage between race, modernity and colonial dominance, it was also characteristic that Risley explained the brahmanical opposition to intermarriage in terms of a resistance to the pollution of blood, raised in relief above all other abhorrences to pollution, as the sexual key to racial purity according to the western notion.<sup>49</sup> It is this sexual

key which unifies, in genetic, biological features accessible to anthropometric investigation a diversely constituted cultural practice, and systematises caste in terms of a centre and periphery, and in accordance with the concept of status measurable by physical indicators of the purity of blood. Status measured in these terms signified a frozen, aeonic hierarchy which was as a whole inassimilable to modern ways of western life and which also restricted individual assimilation to modernity through social laws enforcing cultural entitlement according to the primacy of the bonds of blood. This focus on the sexual basis of caste leads later students like the statistician P C Mahalanobis and the anthropologist D N Majumdar, situated in the cusp between colonialism and nationalism to hark ambivalently, if vaguely, to eugenics as the key to the problems of world (and therefore, Indian) population.<sup>50</sup> We will pause again to examine briefly this colonial history of sexuality later.<sup>51</sup>

Thus, if we telegraph the argument in the paper, the historical path taken by the self-concept of civilisational superiority mires late 19th century British thought about the colonised world in race and retards the ability of that thought to undertake a fully modernising, normative, assimilatory project with welfarist content.

In our own context, we will argue in another essay that it is left to the nationalists to articulate a model of government that is opposed to the rule of colonial law. The work of this nationalist governmentality in local political practice, based on a concept of seva, or service, will also be examined in a case study.

Our exploration of the relationships between race, colonialism and modernity seems to contradict the notion that Eurocentric racism was a fatal flaw in the otherwise potentially progressive structure of western thought which animated colonialism in the late 19th century. We would rather suggest that the network of concepts that fed into and animated the 19th century western discourse of modernity established a mutual scaffolding with Eurocentric racism from diverse philosophical supports. These footholds of colonial thought were quasi-structural features of the British conceptualisation of themselves and the world they ruled over, giving western modernity its inevitably normative, authoritarian and belligerent character when it dealt with the non-European other. However, this racist belligerence was effectively masked by the rhetoric of enlightenment rationality and modern liberalism that articulated the self-concept of civilisational superiority in the modern west.<sup>52</sup>

### Anthropometry and Statistics in Colonialism

Most of Risley's theory of Indian society (brahmanisation as a cultural phenomenon, exclusion of intermarriage, hypergamy, etc) in the *Tribes and Castes of Bengal* would hold with internal consistency, whatever its truth-value, without the support of the race basis he invoked. However, race theory, in the configuration of 19th century thought, provided an essential synthetic link between anthropology and the technique of rule in the path it opened through numerical statistics.<sup>53</sup>

Risley's anthropometry would ensure that the aboriginal would scientifically be rated more primitive than the brahman, and hence the stages of culture as marked by marriage, inheritance, relationship and property could be unequivocally determined. Such a gradation would doubtless offer a theoretical basis for what the administration either envisaged for or already provided the colonised population: a didactic proportionate system of representation overseen by the benign administrative eye for the

barbarous, Aryan; and a simple, paternalistic system of rule for the savage tribal. The structure of the limitation of his thought may be probed further by an examination of his use of statistics.

Risley conducted measurements of the head, nose, cheekbones, orbits, forehead and zygomatic arches, weight, stature, and Cuvier's facial angle, on approximately 100 individuals of each tribe so that the average could be taken to represent a type. The use of averages of samples from each caste was a natural corollary given the umbilical link between the nascent discipline of statistics and that of anthropometry. It would be useful to locate this colonial use of averages with respect to the history of statistics in late 19th century/early 20th century Europe. Ian Hacking has suggested that there were two ways of thinking, clustered around the names of Durkheim and Weber, constituting the statistical and anti-statistical polarities of 19th century sociology. Weber's concept of the type represented a social actor such as a 'capitalist', without the abstraction of numerical averages. Durkheim's method in contrast expressed the phenomenon of suicide (for instance) in numerical statistics. The statistical averages measured a normal state of society, whose stability was the objective of investigation. Hacking also argues that Durkheim's understanding of the statistical average as a measure of normality could be contrasted with that of Francis Galton. Durkheim, a conservative, saw the normal as a concept in which the idea of goodness inhered. For him, the normal was opposed to the pathological, and was a measure of the current state of degeneration (finding expression in anomie) from a perfect past. For Galton, however, the normal was actually the central mean of the normal curve. It was the mediocre, opposed by two abnormal extremes of excellence and subnormality. Society would have to strive towards the pole of excellence to achieve a future perfection – hence Galtonian Eugenics.

Risley's anthropometric averages can be located in the following way against Hacking's map of Weber, Durkheim and Galton. For Risley the average nasal index measured the normal physical characteristics which represented a caste/tribe's stage in the evolution towards brahmanism. It thus gauged on an infinitely larger scale, the degree to which that type fell short of western civilisation. The grouping of the norm through the category of caste on the one hand diffused the individualising focus of a normative intervention, and on the other, distributed the totalising potential of normal population statistics across groups of disparate communities. This diffusion/distribution was bound to weaken the normative and normalising drive of statistical reasoning. A symptomatic reflection of this weakening may be glimpsed in the way in which the organising concept of sexuality, rather than delineating an individually regulative heterosexual norm against a proliferation of deviancies as in Foucault's description,<sup>54</sup> functions as the explanatory key to purity and miscegenation in the colonial context. It facilitates a 'scientific' map of racial progress through the aeons, of different castes towards the normative amalgam which constituted modern European society. Risley's style of reasoning thus led to policy which was the opposite to that of the radical Evangelist educationists at the turn of the century. While the latter, in spite of its pre-normative character, resulted in interventional measures to assimilate the individual to Christianity and its culture, the former led to legislative mechanisms around the mediating group formed by caste.<sup>55</sup> There was in Risley, the organic intellectual of colonial rule par excellence, neither was in him, a Galtonian Eugenic impulse, nor a wistfully romantic, anomic, Durkheimian glance at a golden past.

If we read Risley's scientific/administrative decisions as singular expressions of the evolving structure of colonial thought detailing, accenting and shaping that thought in turn, rather than as a simple personal choice which had neither antecedent nor legacy, it becomes possible to suggest that the imperatives of colonial anthropology (as distinct from a sociology of western life seen in the work of Weber and Durkheim) restricted Risley's research to finding the reason for existence, and ensuring the security and perpetuity, of the colonial state. For the reasons that have to do with what may broadly be called the architectonic of late 19th century colonialism, the statistics in the *Castes and Tribes* series of the colonial census does not yet raise normative questions implying welfare intervention in the lives of individuals who constitute the population under study. That development in all its ambiguity and corruptibility is left to the late colonial, early nationalist anthropological monographs and government reports of the 1930s and 1940s.

The ethnographic background for Risley's report did not involve fieldwork on the part of the primary anthropologist. Risley also biased the samples by instructing his hierarchy of investigators to avoid measuring individuals who did not conform to pre-conceived caste types: brahmans with wide noses and aboriginals with narrow ones.<sup>56</sup> This biased data and interpretation of practices by a board of brahmans naturally led to physical indices that did indeed 'reflect' social ordering.<sup>57</sup>

Karl Pearson showed that there were errors in Risley's calculation of the means and indices (such as the nasal index).<sup>58</sup> B S Guha pointed out Risley's anthropometric error in his instruction to press the lower arm of the nasometre (an instrument to measure nasal length) upwards against the base of the nose until it meets a steady pressure from the nasal spine, which would result in significant distortion. Guha also argued that Risley's measurements were taken by "people whose competence for the work was not beyond question".<sup>59</sup> His samples were also found too small in retrospect and the differences were not statistically significant.

Risley's faults in the statistical department can be better understood in the historical context of statistics and anthropometry. The first index of statistical sophistication of the discipline of anthropology may be seen in a paper written by Franz Boas in 1903, discussing the meaning of the variability of statistical data in anthropometric measurements.<sup>60</sup> Such a discussion would appear today in a statistical primer for the social sciences. Thus, while the mathematician S-D. Poisson had already used the concept of variance (a measure of the variability of data about the mean) nearly a century earlier, its use in the modern statistical study of populations was beginning only around 1900. Secondly, theorisation of statistical inference to estimate population parameters from statistical measures of a small sample begins with Gosset's work on the Student's Distribution (1908). The use of confidence intervals (E S Pearson and J Neyman), and fiducial probabilities (R A Fisher), both refinements in techniques of statistical inference occur in the 1920s. Thirdly, the notion that a given variable such as an average size of the nose occurs because of several (perhaps related) partial causes was first termed 'correlation' by Francis Galton and conceptualised mathematically by Karl Pearson in the late 19th century. Pearson developed the Coefficient of Racial Likeness (CRL) in the early 20th century, using multivariate data to compute an index of racial likeness between populations. Pearson worked with large samples in order to be adequately representative of the population. His rival Ronald Fisher worked with small samples and deduced the

representativeness of the sample rigorously. Finally, the idea that random samples would be more representative of a population than biased ones, first reasoned out by C S Peirce was formalised into the theory of random sampling by R A Fisher in the 1920s.<sup>61</sup> This catalogue should make it clear that Risley's technical failings were largely due to limitations in the anthropological statistics, and in the statistical discipline.

Following statistical anthropology that followed after Risley's work will illuminate the way in which the history of statistics is interwoven with the growth and inflection of governmental rationality as it took its specific form in late colonial and postcolonial India.

## II

### Risley's Legacy: Rupture and Transformation

In this part, we look at two conceptual frameworks for the tribal. One is the evolution of the Risleyan framework of caste as a manifestation of race; the other is a completely new approach to the tribal which comes to the fore in Elwin, and is critically assessed by Ghurye. Between the two, the changing conceptual topography of the tribe becomes evident.

### Guha and Pearson's Coefficient of Racial Likeness

B S Guha's 1931 census study titled 'Racial Affinities of the People of India'<sup>62</sup> is several degrees more sophisticated than the work of Risley. After his critical review of Risley, Guha sets out to study the racial affinities noting the importance of keeping "clear the respective fields of Race and Culture in scientific investigation".<sup>63</sup> He chooses Pearson's Coefficient of Racial Likeness (CRL) to compare two races, adopting a modification which takes care of small samples, and normalising ('reducing') the result to reflect the value of the CRL when the sample sizes are made equal to 100. This reduced CRL permits comparison of more than two groups among each other. Guha calculates the CRLs for caste groups in the following different regions: north-western Himalayan; Indo-Gangetic Plains; central India and Gujarat; Peninsular India; north-eastern India; and finally the tribal groups.

Guha plots the CRLs between castes studied within and across regions. Based on these studies he is able to demonstrate some racial affinities across the Indian subcontinent, thus (implicitly) proving the amalgamated racial unity of India. In an inverted fashion, Guha reverts to a somewhat Nesfieldian position, eschewing commentary on culture in a study of race, and at the same time, demonstrating "the unity of the Indian race".<sup>64</sup>

The most interesting limitation of Guha's study is his focus on the brahmins and upper castes in general. Muslims are studied in the north-western regions, Punjab and Sindh but are not mentioned in either the study of the United Provinces, Bengal or the Deccan which consisted of a significant population of Muslims.<sup>65</sup> On the other hand, while Guha does discuss in detail the kayastha, bania and kshatriya castes, he rarely descends below these groups in his hierarchy of discussion. Only in his incorporation of Edgar Thurston's studies in south India does he talk of the depressed classes such as the mala and madiga in Andhra. His study of the Maratha country mentions chitpavans, karads, deshasta, saraswats, (brahman castes), prabhus (kayasthas) and marathas but has no mention of the mahars, the caste to which Ambedkar belonged, and who during the time of Guha's writing was engaged in a bitter and public political battle with the Congress. Finally, in his map

linking the Indian subcontinent through the CRLs of different castes, the main groupings are the regional brahman variations, with the odd kayastha or kshatriya thrown in. Another aspect of the study is its conclusion that there is a complete lack of any racial linkage between the various aboriginal groups.

The structural biases of Guha's rigorous work point to the dominant social thought emerging under late colonial rule. This does not mean however that Guha was a brahmanical bigot – far from it! He ends an essay on the 'Indian Aborigines and their administration'<sup>66</sup> as follows:

The essential thing is to realise that the tribal and general population are inhabitants of the same country and their interests are closely interwoven for good or bad. The fostering of the growth of a common outlook and common interest should be the ideal for which both should strive. The administration of the primitive tribes should be so planned that this purpose is served by developing them on their own models and thought, but also gradually bringing them up as full and integral members of the country and participating like the rest in her joys and sorrows.<sup>67</sup>

In the 20 years that separate the publication of Guha's paper on the racial affinities of the people of India and this one, there has emerged a theme of integration, amelioration and understanding, all from the implicit perspective of a brahmanical centre, which links and consolidates the nation through its high racial coherence. It is the administrative duty of this centre to integrate the aboriginals of the periphery (who have the misfortune not to constitute a coherent racial group) by 'developing them on their own models of thought' so that they learn gradually to participate 'like the rest' in the new-born nation's joys and sorrows.

### The Mahalanobis Distance and the Rank Ordering of Caste

The final historical document we will study in this review of the Risleyan debate on race in castes and tribes is the study of the United Provinces authored by Mahalanobis, Majumdar and Rao.<sup>68</sup> The paper criticises Guha's work, its empirical underpinnings, theoretical basis, statistical validity, and laments his failure to publish the raw data 16 years after collection. The theoretical objection to Guha's work, however, was that it used Pearson's Coefficient of Racial Likeness which had by then been criticised by both R A Fisher and PC Mahalanobis independently. The problem with the CRL was that it was more a test of racial divergence than a measure. A small CRL was indicative of the two samples belonging to the same race or racial amalgam, while a large CRL was often spurious since the value depended not only on the anthropometric characteristics being measured, but also on the differences in the techniques used by different observers, and on the sample size.<sup>69</sup> Mahalanobis had by then refined his measure of 'group' distance, the  $D^2$  statistic and the original name he proposed for this measure was 'Caste Distance'. Fisher renamed the measure as the Mahalanobis Generalised Distance, in a clear recognition of, and salute to, its extended horizon of application.<sup>70</sup>

Mahalanobis et al succeeded in doubling Guha's average sample size (to 128) and computed the  $D^2$  statistic based on 12 anthropometric characters measured on 22 different caste and tribe groups in the United Provinces. They corroborated the statistical results of the  $D^2$  values using the method of computing canonical variates using 'Mallock's Machine' housed in the mathematical laboratory at the University of Cambridge. After a long and complex analysis, the results were found to be broadly

corroborative of a version of Risley's thesis that "in India, in a general way, the change from more primitive to more civilised conditions appears to have been accompanied by a shift from smaller to larger physical size (with narrow nose) among the different castes and tribes."<sup>71</sup> The gradual nature of this change was seen to be indicative of a racial amalgamation not yet complete.

There are two perspectives from which this paper can be examined, both of which yield a telling commentary on the conceptual predilections of the authors. The first follows, and the second will constitute the next section.

The concept of 'distance' between castes or races, like the nasal index (which only establishes the numerical pseudo rank in an objective number expressing the ratio of the length to breadth of the nose), does not provide any intrinsic rank ordering in terms of superiority and inferiority. It is only a measure of a theoretical distance between one caste and another computed according to anthropometric characteristics. The concept of generalised distance complicates the concept of distance by measurement in a multidimensional space (in this case a 12 dimensional space defined by the 12 anthropometric characters measured). In line with this concept of the generalised distance, the early statement of purpose in the paper is as follows:

The first obvious question is, whether, as judged by the present physical measurements, all these castes and tribes can be considered, in some significant sense, to belong to the same homogeneous group of population. If not, do these 22 castes and tribes show any evidence of internal patterning or any kind of systematic classification in the sense that *certain castes and tribes may be considered to be nearer to one another than others?*<sup>72</sup>

By the end of the statistical analysis section of the paper, however, the authors rather hastily smuggle in the notion of rank by first asserting with inadequate demonstration the presence of a "main sequence" of castes (how does one demonstrate a main sequence in 12 dimensions?) and then describing this sequence thus,

The  $D^2$ -values thus supply a general picture of the following kind. There are three well-demarcated clusters, the brahmins (B-cluster), at the top of the *Hindu social hierarchy*; the artisans (A-cluster), in the middle, and the tribal groups (T-cluster) at the bottom.<sup>73</sup>

In another indicator of the barely hidden agenda of rank in the statistical section, the authors express puzzlement that the 'criminal' tribes, i.e., the Bhatu and Habrus are racially similar to the brahmins thus,

These two so-called criminal tribes are clearly differentiated... but in certain ways form a sub-cluster which is, *strangely enough*, nearest to the brahmins, and quite close to the artisans.<sup>74</sup>

Or yet again, in a frame of reference reminiscent of Risley's injunction to exclude wide-nosed brahmins, they observe that the tribal group called,

[The] Rajwars have a most remarkable feature, namely, the narrowest nasal breadth among all the groups, which is most surprising and requires further study.<sup>75</sup>

The statistical section limits its strictly extraneous assertions to the existence of a hierarchy; the paper then continues with anthropological observations written by Mahalanobis on the basis of manuscript material provided by Majumdar.<sup>76</sup> The author uses anthropological hypotheses to refine and strengthen the now explicit rank ordering logic of the exercise. Thus,

[T]he brahmins were traditionally the priestly class occupying the highest social status in the Vedic age, and have retained their position at the apex of Hindu society up to the present time. They are clearly and unmistakably differentiated from other groups;

and may reasonably be considered to be the modern representatives of the highest layer of the Vedic people speaking Indo-European or Indo-Aryan languages.<sup>77</sup>

In contrast, the tribal groups live in the hills speaking languages of the Austric family with no written script. In a language which today seems blinding in its brahmanism the tribal,

... way of life is usually primitive, and they have social customs and religious practices which differ widely from those prevalent among the brahmins and other high castes in Hindu society. As already noted, they are usually identified with the primitive aboriginals of India, and occupy a position at the bottom or even outside the pale of Hindu society.<sup>78</sup>

In this account as in Guha's, a crucial reversal with respect to 19th century discourse has taken place: the brahman of today is the successor of the Vedic brahman, but he is no longer stigmatised by a selfish parochialism. He is the inheritor of an elite status, without any negative characteristics given him in the colonial discourse.

In the final section of the paper, where anthropology and statistics couple to generate a less than 'Eugenic' offspring<sup>79</sup> the unwieldy complexity of the  $D^2$ 's multidimensional result is abandoned. Instead a serial, one-dimensional ordering generated by scalar addition of normalised mean values of the 12 characteristics for each of the 22 castes and tribes proves the rank hypothesised by Risley's anthropology, albeit with some exceptions. It must be remembered that this conclusion was never explicitly sought at the beginning of the paper, which only expressed the desire to establish the caste distance, categorisations and groupings in an objective manner.

Finally, the conclusion that the modern brahmanical caste represents the 'highest layer of the Vedic people' who constitute the apex of Hindu society even today, as opposed to a tribal who 'occupies a position at the bottom or even outside the pale of Hindu society' is an argument based on arbitrary sample sizes which have no relation to population proportions. Thus, this conclusion reiterates a model of a centre and periphery which does not take into account the weight of the relative populations, or of the ones constituting castes in the intervening social space. The metaphor of the 'apex' of Hindu society indicates that the zones of high social status are sparsely populated. The logic is clearly the Galtonian one where the brahmins represent the rarefied abnormal pole of excellence towards which the mediocre mass must strive. As in the case of Risley, however, sophisticated the statistical reasoning, the perspective of Mahalanobis et al remains mired in the problematic of establishing an implicit Eugenic hierarchy of racial precedence, unable at this stage to even provide a faint precursor to the torrent of welfare and development discourse that emerged out of the Nehruvian paradigm barely two years later. Be that as it may, the preparatory occupation with a 'commanding height' of the social space at the apex of the Hindu social hierarchy, we will argue, brings in its nationalist wake a central planning, which will provide the perspective to occupy the 'commanding heights' of the economy, and to plan the welfare of the people.

## Stature, Race and Nutrition

In Mahalanobis et al's caste ranking, the characters of stature and sitting height occur most frequently, and as the first listed factors, in the determination of the superiority of the race. In all the charts used to compare groups and designate clusters, the first two characters are stature and sitting height.<sup>80</sup>

Since the discussion in Mahalanobis et al, is about the racial composition of the castes and tribes and the gradation is on these terms, we are forced to assume even though it is not explicitly argued, and because another possibility is not even considered, that the authors imply that the characteristics of stature and sitting height are determined purely by race. The paper would be unintelligible otherwise. By insisting on the purely heritable nature of characters like stature and sitting height, the authors ignore Boas' sustained criticism in the second decade of the 20th century of the notion that physical characteristics are determined by purely genetic inheritance. Indeed he had persistently written about the instability of heritable characteristics through out the early 20th century.<sup>81</sup> Boas proposed the notion that alongside the genotype, the ecotype is an environmental limit which acts on size of the body characters often used in anthropometric measurements. He also argued that,

The size of the body depends on the conditions under which growth takes place. Growth depends on nutrition, upon pathological conditions during childhood, and upon many other causes, all of which have an effect on the bulk of the body of the adult. When these conditions are favourable, the physiological form of a certain genetic type will be large. If there is much retardation during early life, the physiological form of the same genetic type will be small. Retardation and acceleration of growth may also account for varying proportions of the limbs.<sup>82</sup>

The insistence on the evolutionist reading of anthropometric characters and silence about the criticism of such a notion by a major anthropologist like Boas provides some insight regarding the nature of the evolutionary, implicitly Eugenicist, style of reasoning 'inherited' by Mahalanobis et al.<sup>83</sup>

A decade after Mahalanobis et al, R M Acheson, in an essay presented in a volume of universal scope titled *Human Growth*, provided a physiological description of how normal stature and sitting height are adversely affected by nutritional deficit.<sup>84</sup> He demonstrated, without reference to differences in racial propensities for growth, that skeletal development (bone size) is stunted while skeletal maturation (bone structure and strength) continues apace during prolonged periods of nutritional adversity, leading to a permanent reduction of the height of the person with respect to the expected norm. In a confident appropriation of the notion of the human norm from this global discourse, V Shatrugna and KV Rao have recently presented the statistics that in the poor urban community in Hyderabad no difference in average height was perceivable between mature daughters and mothers in a sample size of 512 pairs.<sup>85</sup> They argue that due to ageing processes, mean height of adult women decreases by 1-2 centimeters as they grow older, and therefore, had a correction been made for this loss of height, the daughters would actually have been shorter than the mothers by 1-2 centimeters at the same age. Shatrugna and Rao state that in contrast to the women of the poor urban community, the better-off women show the expected secular increase in height between mothers and daughters. Thus, the secular pattern of height change among the poor women in Hyderabad was opposite to that of the normative trend. Such a population oriented perspective would argue that the differences in bodily size and stature posited as a correlate of social status and hence implicitly of racial character in Mahalanobis et al, would be affected by access to food which also varies in proportion to social status. Better-off brahmins had more access to food and nutrition than the poorer tribals and hence nutrition could actually be the 'ecological', or economic cause overriding the genetic predisposition of the difference in stature, build and

weight. The evolutionist retort would have been that the ability to find food is a marker of the survival of the fittest therefore the fitter race is better fed than the weaker one. The differences between this style of reasoning and the nutritionist one are obvious, as are the practical consequences that follow from it: survival of the fittest assisted by a Eugenics programme, versus the delivery of welfare to the poor and needy.

As in the case of Risley, the point of establishing this contrast is not to show how 'bad' Mahalanobis was, or even how evil the paradigm of race was and therefore how lucky we are to have the modern welfarist one in its place. The point is to explore the race style of reasoning and indicate the logical policies that follow from that style. It is also to demonstrate the sweeping nature of the change in styles of reasoning that take place within a short span of historical time. Indeed, the nutritional style of reasoning, which takes off from Boas' insistence on the ecotype, is a welfarist one. The natural step following the argument of a nutritional deficit is one which insists on state delivery of nutrition to the poor. This step almost too quickly becomes a specific welfare instrument in a planned complex of central interventions on the social, economic and territorial periphery, fraught with ambiguity within the larger frame of national development.

Ian Hacking, in a work we have cited earlier in this paper, suggests that both Eugenics and liberal welfare arise from the same archaeological foundations – that of statistics, in which the population begins to appear as one which has to be governed and improved beyond the 'mediocre' mean.<sup>86</sup> We would rather suggest that in the context of the Indian transition from colonialism to nationalist independence, statistics itself begins to fully express its modern normative function in asking the question of government and welfare and eliciting interventionist answers, as opposed to its use in colonial anthropometry to express the states of evolution of different castes and tribes.<sup>87</sup> It is this reconfiguration of the structure and scope of Indian statistical thinking which follows upon the decline of colonialism that in turn facilitates and makes invisible the shift from race to welfare in the thought of both Guha and Mahalanobis. In our limited readings of the relevant texts, this reconfiguration occurs not in the work of professional anthropologists and statisticians like Guha and Mahalanobis, but in the humdrum use of numbers by administrators like R S Malayappan, special agency development officer of the Madras Presidency in 1950-51.<sup>88</sup> Mahalanobis will become the doyen of Indian planning and development under Nehru. The smoothness of Mahalanobis' transition from a statistician invested in racial characteristics of caste to a planner for the nation is an indication of how the discourse of welfare in India provides an idiom which can subsume without trace a career long interest in Eugenics. On the other hand, this perspective of the closeness between Eugenics and welfare makes more understandable the governmental initiative in the 1970s to 'offer' compulsory sterilisation to the poor and thus eliminate the reproduction of a population which is perceived as an unwanted, unproductive ballast on the nation's economy, under cover of the Twenty Point Programme of national development committed to a socialist concept of welfare.

### Ghurye and Elwin: The Tribal in Nationalism

About a decade before Mahalanobis et al, published their paper on the racial basis of the caste and tribes of the United Provinces, another debate took place on the question of tribes and 'what to do with them'. This debate signals a change in the imagined

ground on which the tribes posed a problem, and has implications for the way in which the use of statistics is transformed. Looking at this debate will also help us begin to understand the continuities and ruptures that nationalism brings about in the discourse on castes and tribes and in turn understand the tensions and contradictions of nationalist thought.

The combatants in the debate we examine in this section reflect their philosophical predilections in the prose they write. Govind Sadashiv Ghurye, 'armchair' anthropologist extraordinary, brilliant scholar and polemical interventionist wrote like the steam locomotive: on a single track, with a relentless logic and a remorseless argument, lumbering inexorably to a pitiless destination. Verrier Elwin, 'philanthropologist' who spent an awe-inspiring number of years in the field living among the people he studied, yet almost *persona non grata* in the world of academic anthropology while being extraordinarily influential in the Congress and in the first decade of nationalist government, wrote with an airy brilliance; like the sun on a butterfly's wing, as it lifts off the tracks, puzzling over why the locomotive was bearing down on it in the first place. Ghurye, in his *The Aboriginal Tribes, So-called, and their Future*, was a spokesman for modernisation.<sup>89</sup> His target, Elwin of *The Baiga* vintage, was a Romantic – unclear and ambiguous about what he wanted – who in the end in effect acted to modernise tribal societies.

Ghurye's argument was composed of a series of steps. Establishing nationalism as the terrain of the debate, Ghurye asserted a la Nesfield, that the formation of a single composite 'Indian race' was maturing and anything harming the process should be avoided. He had already demolished Risley's hypothesis by showing that status and fineness of the nose did not go together.<sup>90</sup> Setting sights on the 'so-called' aboriginal tribes, he argued that the 'aboriginality'<sup>91</sup> of the tribal in India was unproven, and that most of the anthropologists hitherto had concluded that the tribes were rejects and the fringe communities at the periphery of Hindu society. Pampering them was unnecessary.

Next he argued that most of the 'stresses and strains' faced by the tribal in the process of assimilation were no different from the lower castes, and no special amelioration was required. The governmental policy of giving them special treatment in view of their unique crisis was wrong because it ran against the integration of a national race and culture.

Third, he asserted that the tribes, being backward Hindus, were troublesome, and were generally bribed into peace by the British. 'Backward' for Ghurye denoted uncivilised, rough and in need of taming. Many, like the santal and the bhil were no less than rowdy marauders who would lose the battle against the civilised, ruthless and predatory Hindu. That was the unswerving route to modern national unity and the detritus scattered in its wake must be ignored.

Ghurye argued that the anthropological fashion of describing the 'loss of nerve' of the tribal was due to the trend set by W H R Rivers in his study of the west's onslaught on the native culture of Melanesia.<sup>92</sup> He asserted that the process of contact and exchange with Indian plainsmen was not as destructive of tribal custom as was perceived in the riverine mirror. In the case of the Baiga, he contradicted Elwin's praise of their culture and asserted that their sexual practices bordering on debauchery measured their distance from the civilised norm.

Finally, Ghurye attacked Elwin's view that the Baiga suffered the most in the Central Provinces, and demolishes his proposal a 'zoo' in which the Baiga may change his culture at his own pace. This conservative paternalistic proposal proved that Elwin

was ultimately a 'no-changer', continuing the policy of British isolationism and unwilling to admit the forces of progress.<sup>93</sup> In addition, Ghurye makes the utilitarian argument that in the interests of the greatest good of the greatest number of tribals and non-tribals, the area should be left open for public exploitation. He then suggests a structure of action to take care of the assimilational stresses and strains of the tribal without the retrogressive step of providing a zoo. What then was the nature of Elwin's proposal that caused Ghurye to react with such intensity?

It would be worth our while to try and explore the conduct and writing of Elwin of *The Baiga* vintage in relation to the literary concept of Romanticism. We may only briefly characterise this relationship to exploit an omnibus concept used to describe the history of western consciousness at the beginning of the industrial and colonial era.<sup>94</sup> This becomes necessary since Stokes has characterised as Romantic the deepest British intervention in the Indian socioeconomic structure, ie, the Ryotwari system.<sup>95</sup> Stokes describes this administrative (and proto-statistical in that it implied the compilation a 'Domesday survey') step as Romantic in a Wordsworthian sense, because it sought to elevate to the centre, the 'noble' peasant who toiled on the land. Stokes analytical manoeuvre drags from Romanticism's otherwise self-congratulatory tenor in the critical discourse of the canon, a description of its practical incarnation with results that exemplify the contradictions of the colonial encounter.

Elwin then, born of missionary-adventurers, one of who "had been nearly eaten in a cannibal village" in Africa, Elwin chose adventure and service in India, in preference to a "dornish career at Oxford".<sup>96</sup> Attracted to the freedom struggle he sought Gandhi. From his own account, we may infer that he was subjected to a deft political pass which established his precise line of flight

I myself had an idea of going to live among the untouchables and trying to do something for them – it will be remembered that untouchability was a very live issue at that time. Then one day as I was driving through the streets of Ahmedabad with Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and Seth Jamnalal Bajaj, I heard for the first time in my life – from the lips of Jamnalalji – the magic word 'Gond'. He urged me to go to the Central Provinces and take up the cause of the tribes who were then almost entirely neglected. We discussed the matter with Gandhiji and he approved.<sup>97</sup>

In *Leaves from the Jungle: Life in a Gond Village*<sup>98</sup> he describes the Gond Seva Mandal, bringing together in confusing juxtaposition a religious attachment to the Gandhian principles of service, respect for the Gond coupled with compassion for his predicament, and a flavor of the lonely life of one who finds adventure at the junction between life in a Gond village and the forest. *Leaves...* ends portraying life at the Gond Seva Mandal at Karanjia in the Mandla district of the Central Provinces, as "wild, lonely and very odd", suitable for an invocation of Blake,

Every moment has a Couch of gold for soft repose,  
And every minute has an azure Tent with silken Veils...<sup>99</sup>

If it were only his confusion, his peripatetic course, his devotion to the marginal, his love for Wordsworth<sup>100</sup> and his taste for Blake that called forth the term Romantic in describing him, our excursion would be trivial. If, however, we look at Elwin's trajectory through a historical lens, some useful questions are thrown open for investigation. Elwin was not alone in his spiritual mysticism, having come to India with a group of four others to join the Christa Seva Sangh which was already in existence.<sup>101</sup> Jack Winslow started the organisation in 1922, with an aim of restoring an increasingly corrupt and jaded Christianity its fundamental

orientation of love. Winslow's and C F Andrews' attraction for Gandhi foreshadowed Elwin's own. If Risley's anthropometry spoke out as a singular expression of colonial rule, what did Elwin's philanthropology speak out as and for? Why did a would-be don spend decades of his life wedded to a Gond, studying her people and the Baigas of central India?

Thirty years after his writing *The Baiga*, Elwin re-describes their spellbinding origin story in the Nanga Baiga, who was god's right hand in creating the world, adding a touch of his own magic thus,

No wonder that the Baiga, tracking his descent from such a distinguished ancestry has an air about him. A king (or perhaps I should say an archbishop) is always peeping through his loop'd and window'd raggedness. And still today he is the magician and medicine-man, the classic type, who acts as intermediary between the other tribes and their gods. He is sent for by the Gonds to charm fertility into their reluctant seed; he is consulted even by the brahmins in time of sickness: it is believed that he can divert hail from a treasured field; he can detect with a divining rod a stray bullock or a stolen goat far more efficiently than the police. This tradition and pride of the Baigas brought them into conflict with the government in two ways...<sup>102</sup>

*The Baiga* is an unusual text. Most of its 500 odd pages are devoted to a masterful description of culture, epistemology, economy and worldview from a perspective which is more Baiga than Elwin. *The Baiga* does not try to be a sensitive English anthropology of that tribe from the inside – it strives to become an auto-ethnography and the contemporary history of the Baiga through Elwin's work. It is as if the erudition and the literary gifts of the Oxford don gone awry are joined to the divine knowledge and celestial poise of the Baiga to pose a philosophical question to modernity.

This shift in narrative moment locates for us the singularity of Elwin's project. Romanticism in Munro and company sought to do stern justice to the oppressed by seeing them from the point of view of privilege. The self-consciousness of colonial authority found a despotic justification and not disturbance in the process. Elwin, a century later, sought to offer reparation for the damage caused by his countrymen's subjugation and exploitation of India.<sup>103</sup> Here, the self-consciousness of the ruler is destabilised by something akin to, but having the potential to exceed, what the literary theorist Geoffrey Hartman has termed "anti-self-consciousness".<sup>104</sup> Hartman describes the work of anti-self-consciousness as a crisis of self-consciousness followed by a dialectical return to innocence at a higher turn through the path of knowledge, at the level of the individual's imagination (J S Mill's specifically) and results in a resolute closure of that excursion. We should try to understand the Elwinian anti-self-consciousness as a singular critical expression of the west's knowledge of itself, not in the imagination, but on a formidable empirical ground. The Elwinian project provides space for a critique of modernity whose implications for the western consciousness are far from certain since the shift in perspective eventually brings into question everything modern including the impulse of adventure behind Elwin's own project. It is this epistemic abyss which makes Elwin suggest the idea of a zoo in almost contradictory terms – a park, not where people go for relaxation, but as a place where the Baiga can find a suitable pace of change in response to the demands of modernity. Thus Ghurye's assessment of Elwin's project as 'no-changeist' is perhaps wrong, but given the former's acquiescence to the modern project, there is no doubt that the two were in antagonistic opposition.

An ordained priest in the Christa Seva Sangh, Elwin found that he had to abandon the fundamental commitment to proselytise. He resigned from the Sangh, ultimately renouncing the practice of Christianity. He describes this in a bald language, leaving many questions unasked, unanswered. Elwin undertook a project to write the world according to the Baiga, but his own language failed his attempt to describe what the Baiga, and indeed, the west itself, needed. Attacked by Ghurye for his supposed isolationism, Elwin, 20 years later, finds in his own text that he in fact has been recommending integration of the Baiga on his terms. No doubt this resolution of the debate is correct when the chapter in which Ghurye found offence is read by itself. However, it is the failure of the concluding chapter to achieve the Romantic tenor of the rest of the book which is of interest – it is a failure, perhaps of Romanticism itself, to find a language in modernity to surpass that project. How indeed does one begin to challenge the imaginary centre of the universe from the periphery, in a language which has become a vehicle for that very universal centrality? Is it possible for modernity, hypostatised as an unfinished, unelaborated, abstract project within the narrow confines of western thought, to surpass its parochial destiny? That is the question *The Baiga* provides the space for.

Of the many contradictory strands that constitute Elwin's exercise, the one that is given political meaning both by Ghurye's attack and by the Congress' support is his wobbly adherence to the Gandhian concept of *seva*. The Gond Seva Mandal is one of the myriad service organisations that sprout in the Indian sociopolitical landscape from the first decade of the 19th century onwards.

Far more than Ghurye's relentless demolition of the theory of the nasal index, the style of reasoning in Elwin's discourse reflects the collapse of the Risleyan racial hierarchy in the nationalist imagination. It is within this reconfiguration of the imagination of Indian nationalism that the power of the statistical norm and governmental rationality are freed from confines of racial thought. The effects of this freeing in practice is another matter altogether. [E]

Email: r\_srivatsan@vsnl.net

## Notes

[This is an independent paper written in the context of a dissertation titled *Seva, Amelioration, Welfare: The Nationalist Passion to Develop the Tribal* being written in fulfilment of the PhD programme in Development Studies conducted by The Centre of Economic and Social Studies, Hyderabad in affiliation with the B R Ambedkar Open University, Hyderabad. I am grateful to Rama Melkote for her gentle supervisory prods in direction and effort. My discussions with Susie Tharu, Madhava Prasad and Jacob Tharu on the problematic of modernity and governmentality have left their stamp on this paper however the usual caveat applies! Veena Shatrugna's inputs on the subject of nutritional anthropometry have been invaluable. Vivek Dhaireswar's presentation of his work in progress in Hyderabad in February 2003 usefully disturbed my set thought patterns. Mary John's comments on the paper were valuable. I would like to thank Deeptha Achar for her invitation that I contribute this paper to her edited collection and for her usually gentle insistence that I finish it on time.]

- 1 See E Stokes, *The English Utilitarians and India*, Oxford, Delhi, 1989, 1959, for a discussion of Evangelism in the colonial intervention. Nicholas Dirks, *Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India*, Permanent Black, New Delhi, 2001, reads Sherring in a related way.
- 2 Ibid, 44.
- 3 Bernard Cohn has shown that the history of the concept of the brahmanical centre itself was much older than the period we are studying, being present in its early avatars in the work of NB Halded, who published a compilation and translation of the *Dharmashastras* in 1776. (See p142, in his *An Anthropologist among Historians and Other Essays*, Oxford University. Press, Delhi, 1987.

- 4 See Bernard Cohn, 'Notes on the History of the Study of Indian Society and Culture', (op cit) for a slightly different argument. See also Dirks (op cit) in 'The Enumeration of Caste: Anthropology as Colonial Rule', for a description of Risley's privileging of brahmanical sources. G S Ghurye was the first to observe that contemporary caste practice was a response to British categorisations of status. See his *Caste and Race in India*, Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1990, 1932.
- 5 M A Sherring, *Hindu Tribes and Castes as Represented in Benares* Vols 1 and 2, Cosmo Publications, Delhi, 1974, 1872.
- 6 The term "ancient jurisprudence" is taken from Jeremy Bentham, *The Principles of Morals and Legislation*, Hafner Publishing Company, New York, 1948, see p 328. The *authoritativeness* (see p 326, *ibid*) of the texts of Manu is clearly the central question of historical research in the domain of caste.
- 7 The point behind the preceding citation of Bentham is to suggest that the spirit of historical scepticism was alive and functioning in western thought relating to colonial rule long before Sherring's exercise in historiographic innocence.
- 8 Ibbetson, D, *Panjab Castes* (1916, 1883) was a separate publication of his work on the subject as commissioner for the Panjab census of 1881.
- 9 J C Nesfield, *Brief View of the Caste System of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, Published Circa 1885*.
- 10 *Ibid*, cited in H H Risley, Vol 1, p xx.
- 11 In 'Mr Nesfield's Theory', Appendix VI, Sir H H Risley, *The People of India*, Thacker, Spink and Co, Calcutta, 1908.
- 12 The naiveté of the historical speculations of these thinkers (as of Risley's narrative to follow) gives us some idea of why the British social anthropologists, especially Radcliffe Brown, and following him Evans Pritchard, rejected wholesale the idea of speculative evolutionism in anthropological explanation, focusing on current social relations and building their explanation on the basis of a thorough structural functionalism.
- 13 J H Hutton's 'Primitive Tribes' in L S S O'Malley's *Modern India and the West*, Oxford University Press, London, 1941, is one example of this reversal. Ghurye's argument against Risley in his *Caste and Race in India* is another.
- 14 See Dietmar Rothermund, 'Emancipation or Re-Integration. The Politics of Gopal Krishna Gokhale and Herbert Hope Risley'. D A Low, (ed), *Soundings in Modern South Asian History*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1968, for the author's comments on Risley and for contemporary evaluations of Risley's character by G K Gokhale and Morley.
- 15 See Dirks, op cit, for a discussion of the ethnographic state.
- 16 Risley, H H, *The Tribes and Castes of Benga*, Vols 1 and 2, Firma Mukhopadhyay, Calcutta, 1891, 1891. Risley's interlocutors may be found in S Jacob, A Lee, and Karl Pearson, 'Preliminary Note on Inter-racial Characters and their Correlation in Man', *Biometrika*, Vol II (1902-1903), p 348 cited in P C Mahalanobis and C Bose, 'Correlation between Anthropometric Characters in some Bengal Castes and Tribes', *Sankhya: The Indian Journal of Statistics*, Vol 5, part 3 1945; B S Guha, 'The Racial Affinities of the Indian Population' in J H Hutton, (ed), *Census of India, 1931*, Vol I, Part 3, Manager of Publications, Government of India, Delhi, 1935; G S Ghurye, *Caste and Race in India*, P C Mahalanobis and C Bose, op cit, P C Mahalanobis, D N Majumdar and C R Rao, 'Anthropometric Survey of the United Provinces, 1941: A Statistical Study', *Sankhya*, Vol 9, Parts 2 and 3, 1949. D Rothermund, op cit, B Cohn, 'Notes on the History of the Study of Indian Society and Culture', op cit.
- 17 Lyall, A, *Asiatic Studies*, nd, cited in Risley.
- 18 See *Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, p xxxiv.
- 19 See *Tribes and Castes*, p vii.
- 20 See Ranajit Guha, *A Rule of Property for Bengal*, Orient Longman, Hyderabad, 1980, and Eric Stokes, op cit, for a history of the land tenure in colonial India, Jeremy Bentham, op cit, uses the term 'pannonium' to describe a legal architecture drawn up from the first principles of utilitarianism.
- 21 The terms barbarous and savage are according to the definition of Lewis Henry Morgan, *Ancient Society*, K P Bagchi, Calcutta, 1982, 1877.
- 22 See *ibid*, p xxxviii.
- 23 See Rothermund, (op cit), for an extended discussion of Risley's role in the Morley-Minto reforms. Rothermund sees Risley's thought as related to the late utilitarian philosophy of John Stuart Mill. Also See Dirks, (op cit), for a narrative of Risley's role in the reforms of 1909.
- 24 See Metcalf, T R, *The Aftermath of Revolt*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1964, pp 314-23.
- 25 *Ibid*, p 320.
- 26 Letter of Stephen to *The Times*, March 1, 1883, cited in Metcalf, (op cit).
- 27 Stokes discusses the play and struggle between liberal and conservative thought in the emergence of utilitarianism in the early 19th century. See 'The Doctrine and its Setting' in op cit. What we are interested in showing here is the common end result of this conceptual opposition in practical colonial administrative stances and actions.
- 28 The strategies used by different western writers to address racism are many. Eric Stokes (op cit) almost completely ignores the issue of belligerent racist imperialism in his discussion of Stephen. Stokes' text as a whole subsumes the problem of race in his analysis of British consciousness of civilisational superiority. Metcalf's account of Stephen (op cit), faces the problem squarely, but treats racism like a monstrous outgrowth of an otherwise liberal and wise western civilisation exemplified in Canning's executive stance after the revolt. Bernard Cohn questions Risley's administrative reasoning for the use of anthropometry in what sounds like a philosophical tongue click regretting Risley's errors of judgment. One cannot help but wonder what use knowledge of marriage customs or a cephalic index would be to an administrator (p 157, op cit). Dirks writes of racism as if it were a known, understood and thus inconsequential, fellow traveller of that real villain created by British colonialism in India, i e, caste.
- 29 Michel Foucault, 'Governmentality' in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller, *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1991.
- 30 This, Foucault clarifies, was not exactly how it was, but how the later writing projected Machiavellianism to have been in order to cut the new path.
- 31 *Ibid*, p 90.
- 32 *Ibid*, p 100.
- 33 Michel Foucault, 'Security, Territory, and Population' in *Ethics: The Essential Works I*, edited by Paul Rabinow, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1997.
- 34 'Governmentality', p 101.
- 35 Stokes, op cit, has discussed at length the structure of the magistracy and of administration in colonial India.
- 36 See Metcalf, op cit, also Cohn, op cit, and Stokes, op cit.
- 37 See 'The Colonial State' in Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1995, 1993, p 18. Italics added. Rereading this chapter after writing my own, I only too keenly realise how much "Native noses..." aspires and strives to be an adequate response and extension to Partha's. This chapter traces an attempt to unravel the full implications of what I will call the 'abnormal destiny' of colonial rule.
- 38 D A Low, *Britain and Indian Nationalism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, 1997, points out that the conditions differed in Vietnam, Indonesia, Philippines and India.
- 39 Stokes' work elaborates the question of law in colonial India. Stokes uses the terms 'rule' and 'government' without the specific differentiation made here. Our use of the latter term implies a positive programme of welfare, through biopolitical intervention in the lives of the people governed. Stokes once uses the term 'welfare' to describe John Lawrence's paternalism (p 244), but the connotations of this term too are not those that we will explore in this dissertation.
- 40 While it is true that the concept of governmentality exceeds welfare, we will pursue a hypothesis that in its historical elaboration, increasing recourse to the statistical normalising instruments of welfare, i.e, biopolitics, provides governmentality with the means of manipulating the population.
- 41 Paper to be published.
- 42 See Nicholas Dirks' characterisation of British rule as colonial governmentality. (See his usage on p 6, op cit, and explanation in the relevant footnote).
- 43 See Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Decentralised Despotism and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1997, for a study which suggests that the question of welfare was almost non-existent in the colonial African context into the mid-20th century.
- 44 Stokes, op cit, See 'The Doctrine and its Setting' and 'Political Economy and Land Revenue'.
- 45 See 'The Doctrine and its Setting', for a full account.
- 46 *Ibid*, p 39.
- 47 We only make this suggestion here. The question of accuracy arises because the differentiation between norm and nature becomes theoretically important only two decades after Stokes' landmark study. However see the next footnote.
- 48 Ian Hacking, *The Taming of Chance*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990. See his account on the 1829 debate about human nature between James Mill and Thomas Macaulay for an insight into

- the difference between a practice based on human nature and what was 'normally' practiced – the notion of the norm begins to take shape around 1828. Hacking describes a later twist in the same debate on education Stokes discusses: while the early proponents were the Evangelicals, the later discussion takes place within Utilitarianism.
- 49 Riskey explicitly uses the word sexual in his introductory essay to *Tribes and Castes of Bengal*.
- 50 See D N Majumdar, *Races and Cultures of India*, Asia Publishing House, Bombay: 1944, especially the paper 'Race and Culture' where he argues for and against eugenic claims (see p 41). Also see P C Mahalanobis' eulogy of Karl Pearson and the Eugenic programme in his obituary *Sankhya*, Vol 2, Part 4, 1936, pp 363-78.
- 51 For a descriptive history of sexuality in the lived colonial relationship, see Kenneth Ballhatchet, *Race Class and Sex under the Raj: Imperial Attitudes and Policies and their Critics, 1793-1905*, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1980.
- 52 This was neither a unique characteristic of the British (think also of the Dutch in South Africa), nor characteristic only of the administrative tribe of colonialism. See Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze (ed), 'The Color of Reason: The Idea of 'Race' in Kant's Anthropology' *Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Reader*, Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge, MA, 1997, for a study of Immanuel Kant's anthropology and geography courses which breathed the sailor's racy anecdote and colonial metaphor.
- 53 Through out this chapter, the term statistics would refer to its use in measuring people and their attributes, not things such as land, minerals, forests, etc. A present history of 'statistics of things' would begin by re-examining the experiments on land tenure.
- 54 See Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, Volume 1, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1976.
- 55 This is the implication of his tolerant description of the brahman's intolerance see p 8 above.
- 56 See B S Guha, 'The Racial Affinities of the Peoples of India' in J H Hutton (ed), *The Census of India, 1931*, Vol 1, Part III, Manager of Publications, GOI, Delhi, 1935. P C Mahalanobis and Chameli Bose, 'Correlation between Anthropometric Characters in Some Bengal Castes and Tribes', in *Sankhya: The Indian Journal of Statistics* Vol 5, Part 3, 1941.
- 57 The Riskey Papers (National Archives) are mostly queries and answers between Riskey and his informers with respect to caste ordering. Also see Dirks discussion of Riskey's conclusions in *Castes of Mind*, pp 215-18.
- 58 Reported in Guha, *ibid*, p iii.
- 59 *Ibid*.
- 60 Franz Boas, 'The Analysis of Anthropometric Series' (1913), reproduced in Franz Boas, *Race Language Culture*, Free Press, New York, 1940.
- 61 See Hacking, *op cit*, pp 205-06.
- 62 *Op cit*.
- 63 *Ibid*, p i. This emphasis on differentiating Race and Culture suggests allegiance to the Boasian school.
- 64 Guha however clearly did not buy Nesfield's functionalism.
- 65 Mahalanobis et al point out this limitation without reference to specific territories.
- 66 Printed in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society, Science*, Volume 17, No 1, 1951, pp 19-44.
- 67 *Ibid*, p 44.
- 68 P C Mahalanobis, D N Majumdar and C R Rao, 'Anthropometric Survey of the United Provinces, 1941: A Statistical Study' *op cit*.
- 69 See p 98, *ibid*, for a description of the CRL's sensitivity to observational technique. See P C Mahalanobis, 'Appendix I: Historical Note on the D<sup>2</sup> statistic', in *ibid*, for Mahalanobis account of his debate with Fisher and Pearson.
- 70 See P C Mahalanobis and C Bose, 'Correlation between Anthropometric Characters in some Bengal Castes and Tribes', *Sankhya*, Vol 5, Part 3, 1941, (pp 249-260), for Mahalanobis description of Fisher's baptism of the concept in the *Annals of Eugenics*, p 250.
- 71 See Mahalanobis, et al, p 199.
- 72 See *ibid*, p 114, italics added.
- 73 See *ibid*, p 180, italics added.
- 74 See *ibid*, p 179, italics added.
- 75 *Ibid*, italics added.
- 76 See p 181, *ibid*.
- 77 P 184.
- 78 P 185.
- 79 One is reminded here of Bernard Shaw's apocryphal riposte to a beautiful actress' eugenic proposal, 'But, my dear, what if the child has my beauty and your brains?' See Majumdar's advocacy of collaboration between disciplines on p 98, *ibid*. Also see his 'Discussion on the application of statistical methods in anthropometry', *Sankhya*, Vol 4, Part 4, 1940.
- 80 See Chart Numbers 9.2 to 10.1; also the classificatory descriptions' use of stature and sitting height as primary differentiating factors in the analytical section of the paper.
- 81 'Changes in the Bodily form of Immigrants (1910-1913)', 'Influence of Heredity and Environment upon Growth', (1913), 'New Evidence in regard to Instability of Human Types', (1916), all reproduced in *Race, Language and Culture*.
- 82 See 'New Evidence in regard to the Instability of Human Types', p 78, *Race Language and Culture*.
- 83 The term 'Style of Reasoning' is somewhat eclectically, but intuitively, borrowed from Hacking's discussion in *The Taming of Chance*. This seems to be more suited to my needs that the original Wittgensteinian formulation, 'Styles of Thinking'. I am unhappy with bending Kuhn's 'Scientific Paradigm' to describe parallel styles of thinking about the problem of population.
- 84 Acheson, R M, 'Effects of Nutrition and Disease on Human Growth' in J M Tanner, (ed), *Human Growth*, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1960.
- 85 V Shatrugna and K Visweswara Rao, 'Secular Trends in the Heights of Women from the Poor Urban Community of Hyderabad', *Annals of Human Biology*, 1987, Vol 14, No 4, pp 375-77.
- 86 See 'A Chapter in Prussian Statistics', *The Taming of Chance*, for a discussion of the debate between racism and welfare. Hacking argues in another chapter "it is often forgotten that [Eugenics] was motivated by very much the same philanthropic utilitarian considerations that underlie all 'liberal' attempts to modify a population" (pp 120-1).
- 87 The reference is to a discussion of the Malayappan Report in another paper (to be published). A detailed discussion regarding the structural characteristics and content of this report is also envisaged later.
- 88 See previous note.
- 89 First published in 1953, second revised edition 1959. We refer here to G S Ghurye, *The Scheduled Tribes*, Popular Book Depot, Bombay, 1959, The earlier version could not be found.
- 90 See the essay 'Race and Caste' in *Caste and Race in India*.
- 91 The term is used by us, not Ghurye.
- 92 *Loss of Nerve* was the title of a book written by Elwin shortly after *The Baiga*.
- 93 The derisory term 'no-changer' condemned those who supported the continuation of gradualist change through British institutions in the Swarajist council entry programme of 1920s, against the more nationalist minded 'pro-changers' who followed the Gandhian programme of non-cooperation. See for instance Maulana Abul Kalam Azad's introductory chapter 'Prospectus of the First Volume' to his *India Wins Freedom*, Orient Longman, Calcutta, 1959.
- 94 Our own thin entry into the voluminous and even now heated debates around the concept of Romanticism are M H Abrams, *The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition*, Oxford University Press, London, 1953; Marilyn Butler, *Romantics, Rebels and Reactionaries: English Literature and its Background 1760-1830*, Oxford University Press, London, 1981; Bruce Wilshire, (ed), *Romanticism and Evolution: The Nineteenth Century An Anthology*, University of America Press, Lanham, Maryland, 1985; Cynthia Chase, (ed), *Romanticism*, Longman Group, Harlow, Essex, 1993.
- 95 'The Doctrine and its Setting', *op cit*, p 9.
- 96 Verrier Elwin, 'Leaves from the Jungle (1936): Foreword to the Second Edition, (1957)' in N Rustomji (ed), *Verrier Elwin Philanthropologist*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1989, pp 1-2. See Ramachandra Guha, *Savaging the Civilised: Verrier Elwin, His Tribals and India*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1999, for an authoritative and readable biography.
- 97 *Ibid*, p 5.
- 98 John Murray, London, 1936.
- 99 *Ibid*, p 53.
- 100 '...Once I Traced the Poet's Steps up the River Duddon to Its Source, Reading the Duddon Sonnets All the Way', Verrier Elwin, *The Tribal World of Verrier Elwin: An Autobiography*, Oxford University Press, London, 1964, p 17.
- 101 His friend Bernard Aluwihare from Ceylon introduced him to the writings of Tagore and the opinions of Gandhi. Interactions with Jaipal Singh (Munda), Sadhu Sunder Singh, Prof Heiler and Jack Winslow showed him the path, *Ibid*, p 36.
- 102 *Ibid*, pp 146-47.
- 103 *Ibid*, p 62.
- 104 Geoffrey Hartman, 'Romanticism and Anti-Self-Consciousness' in Cynthia Chase, *op cit*.